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Correlates of International Alignment* 
RICHARD A. SKINNER 
Old Dominion Unioersity 
and 
CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR. 
Uni.versify of South Carolina 
The configurations formed from the interactions of political units have been tradi-
tional subjects of research. In recent years the tools of empirical analysis have dealt 
with political association at the individual level (e.g., party membership , legislative 
roll-call analysis), the group level (e.g., electoral coalitions of political parties ), and the 
national-international level (e.g. , regional communities, alliances). Little, however , 
has been done to assess the applicability of the numerous concepts , models , and 
theories of one area of research for designs in other fields , despite some apparent 
parallels. 1 Moreover, studies of cooperative associations at the international level have 
focused uponformal'arrangements such as alliances and regional integrative groupings 
almost to the exclusion of informal alignments of nation-states, although the latter 
appear to be equally important entities in interstate relations. 
This study seeks to address one such aspect of association formation at the interna-
tional level, namely , the factors which account for the creation of informal alignments 
whose members are nation-states. The objective is to identify those characteristics 
shared by partners to a cooperative dyad which are associated with , and presumably 
are promotive of, the formation of informal, voluntary associations . In the absence of an 
existing general theory of the dyadic determinants of international alignments , we 
have elected to address this topic in an indu ctive, exploratory fashion by examining 
empirical data in order to generate some suggestive propositions about the sources of 
alignment behavior. Thus , while the analysis is guided by the insights of several 
pre-theoretical inquiries into political association , it is based on no single theoretical 
perspective . 2 
The most generic concept of interstate associative formation , under which other 
variants may be subsumed , is "alignment. " As Teune and Synnestvedt suggest, 
alignment " . . denotes some aggregative stance of a country with respect to at least 
one other country" 3 and refers to all types of cooperation on the international level, 
including "diverse but often related phenomena such as military commitments (al-
liances), common United Nations (or other international organization) voting patterns , 
patterns of diplomatic recognition and visits, and joint diplomatic efforts. "4 
* An earlier version of this study was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society , New 
Haven, Connecti cut , March 21, 1974. 
1 William H . Riker , The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1962); Dina A. 
Zinnes , ··coalition Theories and the Balance of Power ," in Sven Groennings , et. al. (eds. ) The Study of Coalition 
Behauior (New York: Holt : Rinehart & Winston , 1970), pp. 351-68 ; and Brian Healy and Arthur Stein , ""The 
Balance of Power in International History : Theory and Reality ," journal of Conflict Resolut-ion, XVll (March , 
1973), 33-61. 
2 This posture is based on the conviction that there currently exists no one theory of political association of 
sufficient breadth or cogency to inform us of the major characteristics of international alignment fonnation or to 
pennit assertions of the relative potencies of particular factors influencing that behavior . 
3 Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt , "Measuring International Alignment ," Orbis, IX (Spring , 1965), 175. 
4 Robert M. Rood. '"Nations in Combination: A Probability Analysis of Balance-of-Power Alliances ," paper 
delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association , New York, 1973, p. 12. 
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Following from this general conceptualization, an interstate alignment is defined as 
the configuration formed from the predominantly cooperative political actions of states 
toward one another, spanning a wide range of issues and extending across time. 5 
Hence , we propos e to study the determinants of alignment formation by identifying an 
international alignment as the product of mutually cooperative behavior between two 
nations. 
Several elements of this definition require elaboration. First , the degree of cooper-
ation obtaining between two states is regarded to be reflective of, and a consequence 
ol: their official foreign policy behavior toward one another: cooperation is inferred 
from the type of acts initiated by states. To measure conflict and cooperation in foreign 
policy behavior , international events data are employed because the event is a unit of 
analysis serving as an indicator of the acts initiated by national governments on behalf 
of their societies, and pursued beyond national boundaries , to affect changes in the 
behavior of other nation-states and international actors in the international system. 6 
Conceptually, by virtue of the coding procedures and nature of the data sources from 
which they are derived, events data repor t the efforts of national actors to exert control 
over others; they are essentially political actions, goal-directed in the Weberian sense 
of that term, for the purpose of exerting influence. 7 Accordingly , international events 
are useful indicators of alignment behavior because they tap the strategic calculations 
of national decision-makers in their search for security. An alignment defined in these 
terms is thus a product of deliberate cooperative efforts to achieve a fiiendly relation-
ship with another state. 
A second element of the definition of international alignment concerns measure-
ment of the extent to which the interactions betw ee n two states manifest a pr edomi-
nant mode of cooperative behavior. How one measures the degree of cooperation 
between dyadic partners is, to a large extent, conditioned by the dimensionality of 
cooperation and conflict. In general, most researchers accept the assertion that "any 
social manifestation , . , invariably turns out to be multidimensional and complex 
rather than unidimensional and simple. "8 Still unresolved are the questions of the 
number of dimensions accounting for a significant percentage of the variation and the 
conceptual labels applied to those dimensions. A recent review of some of the major 
taxonomic works dealing with interstate behavior does report evidence indicating that 
the behavior is highly structured and relatively invariant over time. Moreover, factor 
analytic solutions support the conclusion that conflictual and cooperative foreign policy 
behavior appear to be mutually independent and distinct forms of behavior. 9 This 
should not be taken to mean that nations manifest a singular mode ofbehavior-either 
conflictual or cooperative - across targets or time or even within a particular dyad ; 
except in extreme cases, we find nation-pairs demonstrating a behavioral mix of conflict 
and cooperation. 
• Further distinctions between types of cooperative behavior among nations are suggested by Sullivan and 
include "formal alliances,""Coalitions," "informal alignments," and "behavioral alignments" ;John D, Sullivan, 
"International Alliances," in Michael Haas (ed .), International Systems ( ew York: Chandler Publishing Co., 
1974), pp. 99-122, 
8 Charles W, Kegley, Jr ., et al, (eds .) fotemational Events and tlie Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy 
{Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975). 
7 Ibid . 
8 Charles A. McClelland , "Some Effects on Theory from the International Event Analysis Movement ," in 
Edward E, Azar, Charles A. McClelland , and Richard A, Brody, International Events Interaction Analysis 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications , 1972), p. 32. 
9 Charles W. Kegley, Stephen A, Salmore, and David Rosen, "Convergences in the Measurement of 
Interstate Behavior," in Patrick J. McGowan (ed. ), Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 
II (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications , 1974), pp, 309-39, 
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The operational directives of these findings are clear: interstate behavior requires 
examination in a dyadic context 10 in order 1) to ascertain its dimensionality and 2) to 
uncover the predominant mode of behavior within any particular dyad . In this way, 
behavior is classified in an empirical, parsimonious , and manageable set of categories, 
and a first step is taken toward identifying the class of nation-pairs typifying alignment 
status. \Vith this research and reasoning to guide us, an operational measure of 
interstate alignment can be unequivocally defined , so as to empirically derive a class of 
such alignment configurations operative in the international system. 
To this end, the international events data of the World Event/Interaction Survey 
(WEIS ) are employ ed. The WEIS data wer e collected 01~ _the basis of sixty-three 
mutually exclusive categories, which segregate the kinds of foreign policy acts states 
initiate. Th e sixty-three categories wer e then collapsed under major categories repre-
senting the basic types of foreign policy acts. 11 To ensure a meaningful volume of 
interaction bet\veen nations , the decision was made to includ e only those dyads in 
which a national actor was observed to interact at least five times with another national 
actor in the period January , 1966, to August , 1969 (44 months ). This decision produced 
a samp le of 452 dir ec ted dyads , possessing a total of 11,007 acts or 81 percent of all acts 
TABLE I. Factor Solution of Dyadic Foreign Policy Behavior 
Factor Factor 
Variable I II '12 
1. Yield .43 .-11 .35 
2. Comment .70 .45 .69 
3. Explain .68 .41 .64 
4. Meet .59 .65 .77 
5. Visit .01 .76 .58 
6. Host .06 .68 .46 
7. Approve .29 .80 .73 
8. Promise .04 .65 .43 
9. Grant .71 .17 .53 
10. Rewa rd .09 .55 .31 
11. Substantive Agree .43 .62 .57 
12. Agree to Meet .59 .59 .70 
13. Req ues t .58 .48 .57 
14. Offer .76 . 17 .61 
15. Urge .69 .45 .68 
16. Rejec t .85 .12 .74 
17. Charge .85 .10 .74 
18. Prot es t .83 .05 .68 
19. Deny . 71 .08 .51 
20. Issue Warning .89 .01 .79 
21. Thr eatening Display .58 .05 .35 
22. Redu ce Relationship .40 .12 .18 
23. Expel-Seize .68 .04 .46 
24. Force .32 .26 . 18 
% of Total Variance .42 .13 .55 
o/o of Common Varianc e .76 .24 
1° Charles W. Kegley and Richard A. Skinner , ''The Case-for-Analysis Problem in the Comparative Study 
oflnt erstate Behavior," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), 
forthcoming. 
11 Charles A. McClelland and Ann Ancoli, "An Interaction Survey of the Midclle East," mimeographed 
(Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1970). 
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in the WEIS data set. Further criteria relating to the WEIS typology 12 produced a 
revised category system of twenty-four classes (See Table I). 
Factor analysis 13 was applied to this data set in order to probe the interactions 
occuring between these nations (Table I). Despite some ambiguities in the loadings , 
the rotated solution identified two dimensions representative of conflict (Factor I) and 
cooperation (Factor II). The delineation of these dimensions allows us to identify, 
when summed dyads are used as cases-for-analysis, 14 which dyadic relationships 
demonstrated an unusually high le el of cooperation. Those nation-pairs which 
achieve highly cooperative exchanges are regarded as informal alignments . The class of 
alignments in the international system was identified by specifying that each aligned 
dyad meet the following criteria for inclusion: 
1) Each directed dyad must be "active," initiating at least five acts. 
2) Each summed dyad must demonsh·ate reciprocity in the number of acts sent and 
received ; that is, each directed dyad must be "ac tive. " 
3) Each summed dyad must demonstrate a symmetrical relationship ; that is, both 
parties must give evidence of a cooperative disposition toward each other. 15 
When these criteria were met between two nations, a mean disposition score was 
computed for each summed dyad to reveal the level of political collaboration in the 
alignment. The resultant class of alignments and their respective disposition score are 
presented in Table II. 
As can be observed, this operationa l procedure produced a sample of twenty-one 
interstate alignments active in the temporal span under investigation . Several features 
of this sample are noteworthy . First , the very small number of nation-pairs derived is 
itself surprising, constituting less than five percent of the original data source, and 
suggests that the criteria used for operationalizing alignment are sufficiently str;ct to 
ensure a selective samp le of cases. Indeed , the sample is intriguing because of the 
absence of several nation-pairs that intuitive judgement would include in the class of 
alignments, such as the Soviet Union and several of the East European countries, 
Great Britain-Canada , and the smaller West European states of Belgium and the 
etherlands with their larger neighbors. While our indicators may not be tapping the 
full range of cooperative exchanges among aligning states, 16 the general impression 
remains that the samp le is representative of the class of behavior that the concept was 
intended to embody. Nor is it particularly disturbing to Bnd that the number of active 
political alignments is relatively small; such a flnding is consistent with previous 
12 Charles W. Kegley, A General Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications , 1973), pp. 28-30. 
13 The technique employed was the principle component variation of factor analysis, orthogonal rotation 
with unity values in the diagonal , and two dimensions specified. 
14 Kegley and Skinner, 'Th e Case-for-Analysis Problem in the Comparative Study oflnterstate Behavior." 
The two variants of the dyadic "case for analysis" are the directed dyad and the summed dyad. The former details 
the non recursiv e flow of behavior between two states (A-->B, 8--->A), whereas the summed dyad aggregates 
dyadic behavior without specifying direction (A<-+B ). 
1
• The disposition index was calculated for each directed dyad according to the following formula: 
DispA-> B = cooperation - conflict 
cooperation 
where cooperation is the factor score obtained for each direct ed dyad on the cooperation dimension (Factor I) of 
the rotated factor score obtained for each directed dyad on the conflict dimension (Factor 11). For a discussion of 
the use and interpretation of factor scores, see R. J. Rummel , Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston , Jllinois: 
Northwestern University Press , 1970), p . 152. 
18 For example, transaction indicators might serve as additional measures of cooperative interaction . See, 
Cal Clark, "Foreign Trade as an Indicator of Political Integration in the Soviet Bloc," International Studies 
Quarterly . XV (September , 1971), 259-95. 
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TABLE II. Sample of International Alignments 
1. United States-Canada (.88) 
2. United States-United Kingdom (.97) 
3. United States-West Germany (.87) 
4. United States-Jordan (.70) 
5. United States-Israel (.90) 
6. United States-South Korea (. 77) 
7. United States-Japan (. 75) 
8. United States-Thailand (.65) 
9. United States-South Vietnam (.84) 
LO. United States-Philippines (.77) 
11. United States-Australia (. 72) 
12. Honduras-El Salvador (.91) 
13. United Kingdom-West Germany (.89) 
1-1. Netherlands-Peoples' Republic of China (.96) 
15. Franc e-West Germany (.90) 
16. France-Soviet Union (.76) 
17. Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union (.79) 
18. Soviet Union-United Arab Republic (.65) 
19. Soviet Union-North Vietnam (.59) 
20. Zambia-Rhodesia (.94) 
21. Lebanon-Israel (.89) 
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evidence that nations are highly selective in the attention they direct to other states in 
the international system, 17 
A second characteristic of the sample is the extent to which it is dominated by dyads 
comprised of the more powerful, industrialized states of the international system, most 
conspicuously the United States. This finding conforms to theoretical images of the 
system as a hierarchical , highly sh·atified political system, 18 in which a few great 
powers are responsible for initiating much of the behavior crossing national bound-
aries. It "fits" as well with previous evidence that activity in the international system is 
highly concentrated, such that 22 percent of the 153 countries examined produced 
over 80 percent of international events. 19 Hence, it stands to reason that international 
alignments would be composed primarily of these active types of national actors. 
More specifically, the dominant presence of the United States in the sample attests 
to the pervasive American involvement in international affairs, as well as the be-
havioral res iduals of U. S. "pactomania" in the 1950's. American preoccupation with 
Vietnam in the 1966-1969 period is also clearly demonstrated by the sample, with six of 
the twelve alignments the United States was a party to involving East or Southeast 
Asian states. 20 Similarly , the period for which data were analyzed indicates the early 
signs of deterioration of American-West European cooperation by the absence of a 
U. S.-France alignment. 
17 Kegley, A Generlll Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior , p, 28, 
18 Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression ," ]ournal of Peace Research , II {1964), 95-119 and 
Gustav Lagos. lnt eniational Stratifict1tion and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, l964). 
19 Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard , "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in 
James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev . ed. (New York: Free Press , 1969). p. 
716. 
20 It should be noted that the skewedness of the sample toward the developed nations , and especially the 
United States, may be an artifact of the WEIS date source, The New York Times . Azar et al. have documented 
the exten t to which the Times reports a greater volume of news about orth American and European nations . 
See, Edward E. Azar et al.. "'The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use International Events Data ," 
International Studies Quarterly, XVI (September , 1972), 373-88. 
102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Third, the geographical range of the sample includes each of the major regional 
subsystems of international politics. The presence of Middle Eastern and Southeast 
Asian nations suggests that a sense of threat from a third party may be a key factor in 
states' cooperative orientations toward one another. However , the inclusion of the 
Zambia-Rhodesia and Honduras-El Salvador alignments in the sample partially viti-
ates the apparent salience of external threat as a general correlate of alignment 
behavior. 
A fourth feature of the sample is signified by the two cases mentioned above and the 
Netherlands-China coalition: namely, that a potentially wide breadth of issue areas is 
encompassed by the sample. Questions of trade and commerce , ideology, and, 
perhaps, race are possible correlates of the cooperative interactions between these 
states. 
Fifth, special mention should be made of several nation-pairs which appear in the 
sample. The Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union and U.S.S.R.-U.A.R. alignments are prod-
ucts of the time period for which data were analyzed. The high level of collaboration 
between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union , for example, is a partial artifact of the 
kind of behavior h·anspiring between the two states in the aftermath of the 1968 
intervention. In both instances, an extension of the data or the inte1volation of breaks 
in the serial aggregation would provide some additional descriptive precision. For 
purposes of this ana.lysis, however , these alignments were retained. 
Finally , our original argument that alignment behavior is a mix of cooperative and 
conflictuaI interactions is substantiated. As the disposition index va.lues reported in 
Table I indicate , a nation's behavior is characterized by cooperation in its relations with 
an alignment partner, but not to the exclusion of episodic conflict. This interpretation 
conforms to the repeated findings that , in general, conflict and cooperation tend to 
covary. 21 
Although no validation tests were pe1formed, these features of the derived sample 
suggest that the intuitive notions expressed in oui·definition of international a.lignment 
have a close conceptual-operational congruence and tap a specific class of interstate 
behavior distinct for its cooperative intensity. 
At the same time , this perusal demonstrates the need for multivariate analysis of 
potential correlates of alignment behavior . The sample itself is suggestive of a large 
number of factors influencing such behavior. The next step in this direction is to 
examine theoretica.l literature on political association , note hypothesized statements 
regarding the determinants of alignment formation , and incorporate them into a design 
for empirical testing. 
IDENTIFYING THE CORRELATES OF ALIGNME TS 
A re iew of the major theoretical and empirica.l studies of associative behavior 
among political units suggests the absence of reliable generalizations relating precon-
clitional and precipient factors to that behavior. Thus , there is a large body of research 
dealing with international alliances 22 and regional communities , 23 emphasizing vari-
21 Kegley . Salmore , and Rosen , "Convergences in the Measurement of Interstate Behavior ," and Richard 
A. Brody , "Problems in the Measurement and Analysis of International Events ," in Kegley , et al. (eds. ), 
International £vents and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy, pp . 120-31. 
22 Julian R. Friedman , Christopher Bladen , and Steven Rosen (eds. ), Alliance in International Politics 
(Boston : Allyn & Bacon, 1970); Philip M. Burgess and David W . Moore , "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory 
and Appraisal of Propositions," in James A. Robinson (ed. ). Political Science Annual , Ill (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co ., 1972); and Ole R. Holsti , P. Terrence Hopmann , and John D . Sullivan , Unity and 
Disintegration in International Alliances ( ew York: Wiley-lnterscience , 1973). 
23 Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community (New York: Rinehart & Winston , 1970); 
James A. Caporaso , Functionalism and Regional Integration (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications , 1972); and 
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ous stages of their formation, maintenance , and disintegration. Holsti et. al. concluded 
their review of existing theories of alliances with the comment that "general theories of 
alliance may actually have only limited validity," noting that "the most striking result is 
the consistency of low correlations" obtained from an analysis of 130 alliances against 
numerous independent variables. 24 Nor have efforts of researchers to identify strong 
relations in the integrative process met with success. 
Several factors may account for these poor results. In the analysis of international 
economic and political integration, scholars lack cases on which investigation can 
proceed . The number of integrating communities is small , and only one such commu-
nity has established a level of integration which might permit assessment of mainte-
nance activities. 
Studies of alliances, on the other hand , are hampered by the lack of behavioral data 
covering the tenure and intensity of most alliances. As a result, most studies utilize 
frequency counts of the number of alliances in force at particular periods and relate 
such aggregate systemic characteristics to other systemic conditions. 25 While such a 
focus may be revealing , it fails to allow one to investigate the impact which the 
attributes of alliance partners may exert on the formation and/or dissolution of their 
relationships. 
A second source of hypotheses are the deductive theories of political coalitions. 
Kelley has outlined some communalities of research on coalitions: 
All are concerned with decision-making in situations in which no single actor can 
specify an outcome and bind all other actors to it. In most of the studies the actors 
clearly benefit by successfully trying to induce others to form coalitions with 
them. In most of the studies the actors accept rules exogenously provided. These 
rules specify relevant resources , the extent of resources necessary to win , and 
what can be won (or lost). Yet actors in the same and different studies are 
differently motivated and the rules are recognized with varying degrees of 
specificity. The coalitions formed may be continuous (that is, governing coali-
tions), episodic (most legislative and electoral coalitions), or terminal (one-shot 
specification of benefits to involved actors ). 26 
Riker and Gamson have developed two models of coalitions based upon the "size 
principle . "27 Both models are attractive for research on the international level -
espec ially in analyzing balance-of-power theories 28 - although there is reason to 
believe that the "situational conditions" required by the models limit their applicabil-
ity. 29 
The more general problems associated with transferring models and theories of 
coalition studies and alliance research to the specific design formulated here include-
William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory ," 
l11temlLtional St11dies Quarterly, XVII (March , 1973), 89-117. 
24 Holsti , Hopmann , and Sullivan , Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, p. 219. 
25 See, for example, J ,. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War , 
1815-1945," in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitativ e International Politics (New York: Free Press , 1968), pp . 
247-86. 
26 E. \V . Kelley , "Theory and the Study of Coalitions," in Sven Groennings et al. (eds.), The Study of 
Coalition Behavior ( ew York: Holt , Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 482 . 
27 Riker , The Theory of Political Coalitions and William A. Gamson, "An Experimental Test of a Theory of 
Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review, XXVI (August, 1961), 565-73 ; "A Theory of Coalition 
Formation," American Sociological Review , XXVI Oune , 1961), 373-82. 
26 Zinnes, "Coa lition Theories and the Balance of Power. " 
29 Burgess and Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances," pp . 346-48. 
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1) the general absence of international situations in which a winning position is 
readily apparent; 
2) the difficulties in determining on a comparative basis decision-makers ' motiva-
tions and objectives in entering an international alignment ; 
3) consequently, the inability to identify unequivocally the benefits accruing from 
alignment participation; and 
4) since this study is removed from the institutionalized foci of alliances , legisla-
tures, or elections in which there are codified procedures, the problems of 
ascertaining in a rigorous manner the extent to which rules or norms are 
important parameters of alignment participants ' actions. 
Rather than attempt any wholesale adoptions of models or theori es from coalition or 
alliance res earc h and th ereby incur the risk of making unwarranted distortions of the 
assumptions of these constructs , we have elected to identify some general propositions 
common to both fields of study and incorporate them into a framework for analysis. The 
framework is a simplified variation of Vincent's "distance theory " of international 
relations . 
Distance theory ... works with the basic concepts of attributes, ath·ibute dis-
tances and behavior ... Attribute distanc es are determined by computing the 
difference (i-j) from the factor scores of nations (i and j ) generated from a factor 
analysis of the ath·ibutes. 30 
For each nation-pair an absolute - as opposed to a signed - value is computed. 
The principle modifications of this theory are 1) the dependent variable - align-
ment behavior - is a subclass of the universe offoreign policy employed by Vincent; 2) 
the distance values computed from the dimensions of attribute indicators are not 
summed but retained as independent measures; and 3) a measur e of third-party threat 
to an alignment is incorporat ed as an indepe ndent variable. 
The central contention embodied by this framework is that the behavior of nation-
pairs forming alignments is a function of their distanc es on dim ensions of national 
attributes and their distances on an index of third-party thr ea t. 31 In the first instance, it 
is hypothesized that as the asymmetry of national attributes increases , alignment 
formation will result. This hypothesis contrasts with the "compa tibility theo 1y" of 
alliances, which predicts that nations align with those nations with which they share 
common or similar attributes. 32 Although coalition studies vary in specifying the 
dir ectio n of actor resourc es and behavior , this hypoth esis is similar to the general issue 
of uncovering what, if any regularities in the bargaining proc ess are attendant to 
alignment formation. 33 
In order to deriv e attribute-distance measures for the twenty alignments , 34 nine-
teen variables were selected from the World Handbook of Social and Political lndi-
cators35 and the entir e sample of 136 countries was factor analyzed by the principal 
30 Jack E . Vincent , "New Model s of Conflict and Cooperation for Int ernationa l Re lations Scholars ," paper 
delive red at the Annual Meeting of the Int ernati onal Studies Association, New York, 1973, p. 33. 
31 The thr ea t index was computed with the formula described earlier (footnot e 15) for all of the 452 
nation-pairs of the original factor solution. The value of the thr eat index for each of the twenty-one alignments 
was derived by identifying the third-party nation with which both members of an alignment shared the highesl 
level of conflict respectively. 
32 Brue<' M. Russe tt , "Components of an Operatioool Theory of Int ernational Alliance Formation ," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, XII (September , 1968), 285-301; Burges s and Moore , "I nter-nation Alliances,·• 
p . 346. 
33 Kelley, 'Theory and the Study of Coalitions." p. 483. 
34 Attrihute indicators for th e Zambia-Rhodesia dyad were not available. 
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component technique. Six significant dimensions of national attributes were discerned 
from the rotated solution accounting for 75.3 percent of total variance, and these were 
labeled in the following manner (presented in descending order of percent of vruiance 
accounted for): 
Factor I - Development - energy consumption , GNP per capita 
Factor II-Militarization - total military manpower, total defense expenditure 
Factor III-Political Pe,formance - party fractionalization, electoral regularity 
Factor N - Cosmopolitanism - urbanization, b·ade 
Factor V - Culture - percent Christian population, percent Moslem popula-
tion 
Factor VI - Dependence - concentration of exports , U. S. economic aid 
External threat was included as a possible correlate of alignment behavior. 35 The 
hypothesis that threat precipitates entry into cooperative associations is replete 
throughout the literature on alliances. Liska has argued this position forcefully, claim-
ing that , "Alliances are against , only derivatively for, someone or something. The sense 
of community may consolidate alliances; it rarely brings them about." 36 
As this position indicates, the inclusion of threat represents a contending 
hypothesis to that presented by the measures of national attributes. 
A ALYSIS 
The six measll!·es of attribute distances and the threat index were regressed against 
the disposition scores of the twenty alignments using the maximum R-square im-
provement variant of stepwise multiple regression. 37 Analysis results are reported in 
Table III. 
The model producing the highest R2 was a three-vruiable model composed of 
Development, Militarization, and Dependence. Before turning to the interpretation 
of this model , some mention needs to be made of the alternative models calculated by 
the regression technique . In light of the model ultimately derived , the best one-
variable model was especially interesting. The index of threat was calculated to be the 
best one-variable model, although the R2 produced was only .05. The calculation of 
more complex models showed that threat did not contribute significantly to the 
accounting of variation until a five-variable model was generated, and, even here, 
produced an increase in R2 of only one percent. Similarly , the decision to employ the 
TABLE III. "Best Model" of Correlates of Alignments 
1 2 3 
Development Militarization Dependence R2 F 
b = 0.79 b = - 0.80 b = - 1.11 .66 9.91 
t = 5.29 t = - 5.28 t = - 2.10 
35 Michael C. Hudson and Charles L. Taylor , World Handbook of Social andPoliticallndicators , II (New 
Haven : Yale University Press , 1972). 
36 George Liska. Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press , 1962), p. 12. 
37 This technique defines the "best model" for producing the highest R2 by analyzing every one•, two- ... 
k-variable t'Ombination. Once a model is obtained , each of the variables in the model is subsequently compared 
to each variable not in the model. "For each comparison, the procedure determines if removing the variable in 
the model and replacing it wit!, the presently ex.eluded variable would increase R2 . After all the possible 
comparisons have been made , the switch whicb produces the largest increase in R2 is made . Comparisons are 
made again , and the process continues until the procedure finds that no switch would increase R2"; Anthony J. 
Barr and James H. Goodnight, Statistical Analysis Systems (Raleigh: University of North Carolina State Press, 
1972), p. 128. 
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three-variable model was predicated on the finding that a four-variable model which 
included a distance measure of Political Performance accounted for 68 percent of 
variation - an increase of only two percent in R2 . Ind eed, the entire set of seven 
corre lates produced an improvement of only three percent over the three-variable 
model. The three-variable model represents a parsimonious solution , and, at the same 
time, reaffirms our intuitive position that bivariate analyses of interstate behavior are 
generally insufficient for dealing with the complexity of that behavior. 
INTERPRETATIO 
The three-variable model relating distance scores on the Development , Militariza-
tion , and Dependence attribute dimensions provides , at once, partial support for both 
the compatibility and distance theories and a challenge to the assertion that external 
threat is a key correlate of international alignment. As noted above, the index of threat 
failed to demonstrate any degree of potency in accounting for alignment behavior. This 
may reflect the overall patterns of international interaction outlined by McClelland 
and Hoggard. Their analysis of the WEIS data indicated that interstate relations "are 
not quite as conflict-ridden as some have supposed. "38 Hence , the formation of 
cooperative associat ions among nations seems to be motivated less by decision-makers' 
perceptions of clear-and-present threats , than by implicit recognitions of the hierar-
chical configuration of states and the skewed distribution of capabilities within the 
international system. 
At the same time , it seems probable that alignments are products of proc esses, 
requiring longitudinal observations and analysis. This conceptualization suggests that 
threat may indeed serve as a precipitant factor for states' initial associative actions. 
Subsequent developments in the alignment process resemble learning models in 
which member behavior is conditioned by learned expectations of the actions/re-
actions of other alignment members. 39 A cross-sectional design such as ours cannot test 
for these dynamic processes , and we heartily endorse further research embodying 
longitudina l analyses of cooperative interactions. 
Turning to the confirmatory aspects of this analysis , we find an intennix of results 
regarding the compatibility and distance theories of international political association. 
Recalling that our independent variables are measured in terms of attribute distances 
between alignment partners , the sign of the respective regression coefficients 0J) is 
readily interpretable . A negative sign for b, as in the case of the Militarization and 
Dependence corre lates, signifies that the greater the distance between two aligning 
states, the less the intensity of cooperative behavior. Conversely, a positive value for b, 
as with the Development measure, signifies that the greater the distance between two 
nations on this attribute dimension , the higher the intensity of alignment. It is the 
patt ern of positive and negative regression coefficients that guides our interpretation of 
the regression model. 
The distance theory is rendered plausible by the Development variab le's presence 
and its positive h-value in the three-variable model. But in light of the negative b-value 
associated with the Dependence measure , we are led to conclude that the assymmetry 
the distance predicts for alignm ents is large ly one of economic inequality behveen 
alignment partners , rather than a client-patron relationship. Further credence is 
afforded this interpretation by the negative b-value of the Militarization variab le: 
aligning states generally share commensurate (albeit, relative ) levels of military capa-
bility. Alignments thus represent a strategy for' smaller states whereby resources are 
38 McClelland and Hoggard , "Co nflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations ," p . 716. 
39 Sullivan , "International Alliances," p. IOI. 
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indirectly augmented through cooperative association with larger, more developed 
nations. 
For more developed countries, alignments offer means for enhancing status or 
prestige. Moreover , since national decision-makers contend with an uncertain envi-
ronment in which a winning margin is usually indeterminate, alignment formation, 
even with less-developed partners , provides a strategy for aggrandizement of national 
power. · f th t·b·J·ty th · h t ·11 al' . h The primary contention o e compa 1 1 1 eory 1s t at s ates w1 1gn wit 
those nations with which they share common characteristics such as culture , language , 
or political institutions. Although our analysis does not incorporate all of the represen-
tative indicators of the theory , the one measure - Culture - which is analyzed does 
not constitute a potent correlate in any of our results. Still , the raw data for this 
dimension were primarily measures of religious affiliation within nations , and it 
therefore remains unclear whether this particular aspect of the compatibility theory is 
upheld by our results. 
Alternatively and to the extent that the compatibility theory is intended to embody 
similarities of national attributes as correlates of international alignments , our findings 
offer only partial support for this contention. The negative b-values of the Militariza-
tion and Dependence dimensions conform to the notion of states that 1) share relatively 
similar levels of military capability and 2) are not dependent upon other nations via aid 
or trade acting to form cooperative associations. 
In reh·ospect , the partial support afforded both the distance and the compatibility 
theories by this analysis is not especially contradictory. A review of the twenty-one 
aligning dyads identified earlier reveals that a crude dichotomy may resolve the 
apparent conundrum. Many of the alignments to which the United States and the 
Soviet Union are partners are representative of the asymmetric relationships de-
scribed by the distance theory. American alignment with Jordan , Thailand, and South 
Vietnam, as well as Soviet cooperation with the U.A.R. and orth Vietnam , typify a 
developed / less developed alignment. 
The second group of alignments includes the Honduras-El Salvador , United 
Kingdom-West Germany, France-West Germany , and Zambia-Rhodesia dyads , and 
provides a substantive example of the type of symmetric relationship predicted by the 
compatibility theory . 
The dichotomization of the original twenty-one alignments also gives rise to a 
reconsideration of the role of threat in alignment formation. Although our findings cast 
doubt on the importance of threat for dyadic cooperation, other situational variables 
such as the war experience of an alignment member may serve to more fully test the 
potency of a nation 's conflictual milieu for its cooperative actions. 
A final note of interpretation concerns the issue of systemic influences upon 
alignment behavior. The large number of alignments involving either the United 
States or the Soviet Union suggests that future research in this field might well benefit 
from Galtung's theory of rank and social status. His concepts of"top dog" and "under-
dog" seem well-suited to analyses of dyadic patterns of cooperation. 40 
Problems specific to this study (e.g., the small number of alignments, our reliance 
upon one type of data for measuring alignment behavior ) as well as the more persistent 
dilficulties of empirical research (e.g., random and systematic measurement errors) 
place obvious limitations on the scope of our findings. Further refinement of concepts 
40 Johan Gal tung , "Rank and Social Integration : A Multidimensional Approach ," in Joseph Berger , Morris 
Zelditch, Jr. , and Bo Anderson (eds .), Sociological Theories in Progress (Boston : Houghton Miffijn, 1966), pp . 
145-98. 
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and methods and a more extensive explication of the "p rethem-y" of international 
alignments are in order. 
Despite these problems , we are sufficiently encouraged by our findings to urge an 
extension and expansion of the model of international alignment formation presented 
here . We perceive our results as both a chalJenge and a complement to existing 
theories of international political association and the research strategies each entails. 
This conclusion suggests that some revision of the conventional wisdom regarding the 
relative potencies of particular factors in contributing to the formation of international 
alignments should be considered. 
